

THE *ĒTHOS*/*PATHOS* DISTINCTION IN RHETORICAL AND LITERARY CRITICISM*

Jasper Griffin, in his recent book on Homer, has suggested that modern critics would do well to pay more attention to the localized insights and the general critical framework of the ancient Greek commentators.¹ In a previous article, 'Homeric Pathos and Objectivity', he claimed to show, by careful study of those passages in which the scholiasts found *ἔλεος*, *οἶκτος* or *πάθος*, that 'the ancient scholars were right to regard pathos as one of the most important elements in the *Iliad*'.² I also think this is a potentially fruitful and underdeveloped approach to the criticism of Homer and other ancient authors; and that the term *pathos*, together with *ēthos*, with which it is often coupled or contrasted, is one of the most suggestive, though also confusing, of ancient critical terms. I want to begin the story further back in time than the scholia, in the treatises on rhetoric and poetics from which the scholiasts' critical vocabulary was largely derived.³ I propose to survey the use of *ēthos* and *pathos* as contrasted terms⁴ in these treatises from Aristotle to Longinus,⁵ in the hope that such a survey will not only clarify the various meanings and associations attached to these terms but will also throw a more general light on ancient critical presuppositions. Both Aristotle and Longinus used the *ēthos/pathos* distinction to contrast the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*; and a clearer understanding of the significance they gave to these words may help us to appraise the critical usefulness of their comments.

I will begin by citing these comments, together with a related statement by Quintilian, to set the scene for this discussion.

καὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἡ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου) καὶ ἠθική (Arist. *Poet.* 24, 1459b13–15).

Diversum est huic, quod *πάθος* dicitur, quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus; et, ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud (i.e. *ἡθος*) comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile (Quint. 6. 2. 20).

* I am grateful to Friedrich Solmsen, Donald Russell and Elaine Fantham for reading an earlier version of this article and making a number of helpful comments and criticisms.

¹ *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), p. xiv.

² *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976), 161–87, esp. pp. 161 and 183. Griffin also examined the scholiasts' use of the cognate adjectives and adverbs. This discussion seems to bear out Griffin's apparent assumption that *πάθος* means 'pathos', but one would have liked to see this assumption defended, or at least explained. A revised form of the article appeared in Griffin's book as ch. 4, 'Death, Pathos and Objectivity'. From here on in this article the terms *pathos* and *ēthos* will normally appear in transliterated form.

³ cf. William G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation = Scholia Aristophanica* ii (London, 1905), pp. 138–46, who discusses the rhetorical background to the commentators' use of *ēthos* and *pathos*, and Max Pohlenz, 'Τὸ πρέπον', *NAWG* 16 (1933), 53–92, esp. pp. 67–70.

⁴ I am concerned here only with cases where the two terms are contrasted. They are often coupled, especially in the form *ἥθη καὶ πάθη*, cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. p. 67 and Eva Keuls, *Plato and Greek Painting* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 98 ff.; and their meanings seem sometimes to merge in the scholia, cf. W. Kroll, 'Ἐν ἡθελ', *Philologus* 75 (1918), 68–76. I do not propose to explore those developments here.

⁵ I shall refer simply to Longinus, without inverted commas or brackets, denoting the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*. As for his date, 'the received opinion today is that we have to do with a book of the first century A.D.', Russell in D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom, ed., *Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations* (Oxford, 1972), p. 461.

δεύτερου δὲ εἵνεκα προσιστορήσθω τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσειαν, ὅπως ἤ σοι γνῶριμον ὡς ἡ ἀπακμὴ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεύσι καὶ ποιηταῖς εἰς ἥθος ἐκλύεται (Longin. 9.15).

Let us take Aristotle's comment on Homer first, and then consider his use of the *ēthos/pathos* distinction more generally. The passage on Homer is not the first in which we find the contrast used. Earlier in the *Poetics*, he lists four types of tragedy, distinguished by their dominant element: one type is the *pathētikē* (he gives the *Ajax*-tragedies as examples), another is *ēthikē* (18, 1455 b32–1456 a 3). In the absence of any other indication, it seems natural to take *ēthikē* as 'expressive of *ēthos*' ('character'), in the sense in which that term is used elsewhere in the *Poetics*. This type of play is dominated by scenes and speeches that convey 'character', perhaps (since Aristotle regards this as especially suitable for tragedy) ethically 'good' character.⁶ *Pathētikos* elsewhere in Aristotle, as we shall see, signifies 'productive of emotion' (in the audience). But this meaning is too broad for the present context, since Aristotle regards the production of certain emotions, namely pity and fear, as the function of *all* tragedies, a function best fulfilled by the 'complicated' tragedy, which is another of the four types.⁷ Aristotle seems to mean by this phrase a tragedy which centres on a *pathos*, in the semi-technical sense he gives that word in the *Poetics*, that is, *πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ, οἷον οἱ ἐν τῷ φανερώ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ παρωδυνίαι καὶ τρώσεις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα*.⁸ Sophocles' *Ajax*, with the description of Ajax's brutal treatment of the supposed Atreidae and his suicide on stage, may be a good example of what Aristotle has in mind. But probably we should not take *pathētikē* too narrowly here. In chapter fourteen, Aristotle closely connects the tragic *pathos* (and especially specific types of *pathos*, those involving members of the same family) with the production of the emotions of pity and fear.⁹ In chapter eighteen too, when he isolates the *pathētikē* type of tragedy, he may have in mind the fact that the inclusion of tragic *pathē* makes the play more *pathētikē*, in the sense of productive of emotion in the audience. Thus, a *pathētikē* tragedy, as distinct from a 'complex' one, should probably be understood as one in which the production of pity and fear depends on some striking act of violence (probably described rather than enacted) rather than on the 'complications' of the plot.

This discussion of different types of tragedy may illuminate Aristotle's later comment that the *Iliad* is 'simple and *pathētikos*' while the *Odyssey* is 'complex' – with recognitions all the way through – and *ēthikē*' (24, 1459 b13–16). The *Iliad* produces the desired emotional effect on the audience (perhaps pity and fear again)¹⁰ by the

⁶ cf. D. W. Lucas, ed., Aristotle: *Poetics* (Oxford, 1968), *ad loc.*, who clarifies this confusing passage. On tragic *ēthos*, see *Poet.* 2, 1448 a 1–18, 13 *passim*, esp. 1453 a 16–17, 15, 1454 a 16 ff., 1454 b 8 ff. Cf. Eckart Schütrumpf, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes ēthos in der Poetik des Aristoteles*, *Zetemata Monographs* 49 (Munich, 1970), esp. pp. 52–63, who effectively defends the view that, when Aristotle in the *Poetics* describes people as 'good' (e.g. *σπουδαῖοι, ἐπιεικεῖς*) with respect to *ēthos*, he is using these terms in the same sense as in the ethical writings. See also n. 12 below. For the connection of *ēthos* with *προαίρεσις*, and with speeches denotative of this, see *Poet.* 6, 1450 b 8–11, 15, 1454 a 17–19.

⁷ See 18, 1455 b 34–5, 6, 1449 b 24–8, 13, 1452 b 28 ff.

⁸ 12, 1452 b 11–13; cf. B. R. Rees, 'Pathos in the *Poetics* of Aristotle', *G & R* 19 (1972), 1–11, who discusses the puzzling phrase *ἐν τῷ φανερώ θάνατοι* and suggests that it probably means deaths described by messengers as well as those exhibited on the *ekkuklēma* or shown on stage.

⁹ See 14, 1453 b 11 ff. The *OT* owes much of its emotional impact to the violent *pathos* the play uncovers, Oedipus' killing of his father (1453 b 29–32), and the violent acts this discovery provokes in Jocasta and Oedipus (perhaps alluded to at 14, 1453 b 3–7). But the *OT* is a classic example of a 'complex' tragedy rather than a *pathētikē* one, because these elements are integrated in a plot which hinges on a striking combination of *peripeteia* and *anagnōrisis* (11, 1452 a 29–33).

¹⁰ This is not explicit, but may be implied. Cf. Lucas on 60 a 12, 62 b 13.

portrayal of striking violence, such as Achilles' killing of Hector and brutality to his corpse. It may seem rather puzzling that the *Odyssey* should be regarded as any more 'expressive of *ēthos*' than the *Iliad*. Does not Achilles, for instance, notably reveal his *ēthos*, by his speeches in Book Nine as well as by his actions?¹¹ And yet, one can see that the *Odyssey* does, in a clearer and more straightforward way, contain the kind of *ēthos* Aristotle is especially concerned with, in epic as well as tragedy, that is, *ēthos* demarcated by excellence or defectiveness, showing men up as good or bad.¹² Aristotle, in fact, refers to this feature of the *Odyssey* elsewhere, saying that 'it has opposite endings for the better and worse people' (13, 1453a 32–3). That is, the 'better people', Odysseus and his allies, finally obtain the success they deserve and the 'worse', the suitors, the punitive death they deserve. Aristotle speaks of this type of ending, in tragedies at least, as inferior to the best, most tragic ending he has carefully analysed in chapter thirteen, and more appropriate, in the kind of pleasure it gives the audience, to comedy.¹³ This point may open up a rather wider interpretation of the sense in which the *Odyssey* is *ēthikē*, and perhaps too of the intended contrast with the *pathētikon Iliad*. The *Odyssey* is 'ethical', both in showing people who are 'ethically' distinguished, and in showing them meeting their just deserts; this is the sort of plot which appeals to our *φιλανθρωπία*, though it does not stimulate pity and fear.¹⁴ The *Iliad* is different in these respects. The 'better' and 'worse' are not so clearly demarcated, nor is there any clear connection between the deserts of character and the outcome of events. There is suffering on all sides, and the poem ends rather on a note of lamentation.¹⁵ In this sense, the *Iliad* is more tragic than the *Odyssey*, whose ending is more appropriate to comedy.¹⁶ These points are not spelled out by Aristotle, but they are consistent with his general line of thought; and he may have this wider contrast in mind when distinguishing the 'ethical' *Odyssey* from the 'pathetic' or 'emotional' *Iliad*.

There is a general feature of Aristotle's treatment of character and emotion in the *Poetics* which is worth noting, since it illuminates his whole approach to tragic and epic character, besides underlying his use of the *ēthos/pathos* contrast. Aristotle confines his discussion of epic and tragic figures to consideration of their *ēthos*, and has little or no discussion of their emotions, or the interplay between character and

¹¹ For Aristotle's view of Achilles' *ēthos* see 15, 1454b 8–15, discussed fully in Gerald F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), *ad loc.* All subsequent references in this article to 'Else' denote this work, unless otherwise specified.

¹² See *Poet.* 2, 1448a 1–5, 11–12, 3, 1448a 25–9, 4, 1448b 24 ff. This contrast between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* I propose to explore elsewhere; but an obvious example of what I have in mind is that the dialogue and narrative of the *Odyssey* is permeated with adjectives and adverbs which divide people into two 'camps': those who are sensible, wise, thoughtful, and those who behave with recklessness, thoughtlessness, lawless arrogance, whereas this is not so obviously true of the *Iliad*.

¹³ 13, 1453a 30–6. In 14, 1454a 4–9, notoriously, he takes a different view; cf. John Moles, 'Notes on Aristotle, *Poetics* 13 and 14', *CQ* n.s. 29 (1979), 77–94, esp. pp. 82 ff.

¹⁴ 13, 1453a 1–7; cf. Else, pp. 531 ff.

¹⁵ Lamentation for Hector, *Il.* 24. 704 ff.; cf. the scene of mutual lamentation between Achilles and Priam, 507 ff. The latter scene contains the speech of Achilles on the arbitrariness of divine punishment and reward that Plato found so offensive (527 ff.; cf. *Resp.* 379d). Aristotle's theory of tragedy, by contrast, accepts undeserved suffering as a prime tragic theme, provoking the 'proper pleasure' of pity and fear; cf. *Poet.* 13, *passim*, and I. M. Glanville, 'Tragic error', *CQ* 43 (1949), 47–56, esp. pp. 52–6.

¹⁶ In this respect, Aristotle's thinking seems to anticipate the later link between *ēthos* and comedy; though, of course, he knows only old and middle comedy and not the Menandrian comedy later critics associated with *ēthos*. See further L. A. Post, 'Menander in current criticism', *TAPA* 65 (1934), 13–35, esp. pp. 14 ff., 'Aristotle and Menander', *TAPA* 69 (1938), 1–42; and n. 57 below for the later sense of *ēthos*.

emotions; although such discussion might have illuminated his comments on *ἁμαρτία*, at least on one view of that term's meaning.¹⁷ The emotions that are discussed are rather those of the audience. He devotes great attention to the means of producing the proper tragic emotions in the audience.¹⁸ These emotions are produced by the sufferings of the people represented (*pathē* in this sense of the word);¹⁹ and, of course, the sufferings must be partly produced by, and accompanied by, emotional reactions on the part of the people concerned. But on these Aristotle is remarkably silent.

An interesting passage in this respect is chapter seventeen, where Aristotle is giving various pieces of advice to the practising dramatist to aid imaginative involvement in the play he is composing. What is striking is that he seems to conceive the process of dramaturgy essentially in terms of the relationship between poet and audience, rather than in terms of the imaginative creation of characters and their emotions. Thus, for instance, he advises the dramatist to 'place the scene before his eyes... as vividly as possible (*ἐναργέστατα*)'. And it becomes clear from his elaboration of this point that the scene he has in mind is that in the theatre, which the audience will see, rather than the fictional situation, or the situation as seen from the point of view of the fictional character.²⁰ The same feature comes out in the second piece of advice, that the poet should 'work out his play as far as possible with gestures. For, where poets have the same natural ability, the most persuasive ones are (those who compose) in an emotional state (*ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*). The one in a storming state storms most realistically (*ἀληθινώτατα*) and the one in an angry state is angry (most realistically).' Of course, Aristotle must have in mind the writing of appropriate lines for an actor which will represent a character who is having the emotions described. But those are not the terms in which he talks. Rather he seems to imagine the playwright himself, like an orator, standing before the audience himself, and playing on their emotions (being 'persuasive' or 'realistic') through his own capacity for emotional self-involvement.²¹ Of course, one needs to make allowance for the crabbed and incomplete

¹⁷ T. C. W. Stinton, 'Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy', *CQ* n.s. 25 (1975), 221–54, esp. pp. 228–35. One way of describing some at least of the cases of Aristotelian *ἁμαρτία* Stinton thinks appropriate to tragedy would be to say that the central figure acts in the grip of *pathos* instead of expressing his, generally good, *ēthos*; see Stinton's cases (2), (3), (4) on 232. In the *Poetics* it is only in 15, 1454b11–15 (Achilles et al. *ὀργίλους* but *ἐπιεικεῖς*) that Aristotle comes close to considering the interplay of character and emotion.

¹⁸ e.g. 6, 1449b24–8, 9, 1452a1 ff., 13–14, *passim*.

¹⁹ 14, 1453b18 and context; cf. 14, 1453b3–7, 13, 1453a17–22.

²⁰ 17, 1455a22 ff. Lucas, *ad loc.*, thinks Aristotle has in mind both 'the original situation, as it existed at Thebes during the plague for instance, or the situation as it was to be represented in the theatre of Dionysus', but it is certainly the latter Aristotle has in mind in 26–9. In Quint. 6. 2. 32 and *De Sublim.* 15. 1 ff., which seem, like Hor. *Ars P.* 101 ff., to be developments of this passage (cf. Lucas on 55a32), the question of *ἐνάργεια* is extended to the point of view of the fictional character. The poet imagines the scene as the character sees it and is thus enabled to convey the character's emotional response in words and so make the audience see the scene (and feel the corresponding emotions) from the character's viewpoint.

²¹ 1455a29–32. My translation follows the interpretation of Lucas; cf. Ingram Bywater, *Aristotle On the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), *ad loc.* Lucas finds Aristotle's identification of the poet with the performer 'somewhat bizarre', and Else finds it inconceivable and reinterprets the whole passage accordingly (taking *σχήμασιν* to mean 'figures of speech' and referring *ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν* to the – unmentioned – dramatic characters). But John Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 34–5, is surely right to insist that we retain, and accept, the plain meaning of the text. As Else, in spite of his interpretation, points out, Aristotle's model of the poet goes back to Plato; at least, 'This idea, that the poet lurks behind and in his characters to establish an emotional sway over his audience... is in fact Plato's assumption in the third book of the *Republic*' (pp. 491, cf. 494, *Resp.* 392d ff., cf. *Ion* 553d–e and *Resp.* 605d, *ἀκροώμενοι* 'Ομήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα...).

form of Aristotle's lecture notes on poetry. But it seems still to be true that Aristotle is not disposed to discuss 'emotion' in the *Poetics* in terms of the imagined state of mind of the fictional character, but rather in terms of the state of mind that the poet wants to induce in the audience, partly through the poet's own capacity for emotional adaptability and self-arousal.²²

There is a striking analogy between Aristotle's thinking on this point in the *Poetics* and his approach in the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle makes it plain early in the *Rhetoric* that he associates *ēthos* with the presentation, or self-presentation, of the speaker, and *pathos* with the production of the appropriate reactions in the audience. Of the three kinds of proof, one depends on the *ēthos* of the speaker, and on his ability to show that he is 'trustworthy', that he has the socially approved ἀρεταί or excellences, that he makes decisions and performs actions as a good man should.²³ A second type of proof depends on τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες.²⁴ And throughout the work there is a tendency to associate *ēthos* with the speaker and *pathos* or *pathē* with the desired emotional impact on the audience.²⁵ Now this tendency makes good sense in a rhetorical context. It is natural that the speaker should want to present himself as a person of good character; and, indeed, such a presentation is crucial to winning the audience's goodwill and so influencing their feelings.²⁶ But the speaker will not generally want to present himself as in the grip of passion either during the speech,²⁷ or in the events described in the speech. It will not normally be useful to him to present himself as having acted from *pathos* instead of from his usual good *ēthos*.²⁸

ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες). Aristotle seems to see the poet as a quasi-orator (as well as rhapsode-actor); see πιθανώτατοι in a 30. Hence the apparent attraction of the passage for orators; see refs. in n. 20 and Cic. *De Or.* 2. 188–97. Lucas' comparison to Ibsen, 'I have to visualize his whole exterior too, down to the last button...', i.e. visualization of the appearance of the character (note on 55a32), is not very appropriate.

²² 1455a32–4. The passage either adopts (Lucas, Bywater) or modifies (Else) the Platonic idea of the 'madness' of the poet.

²³ *Rh.* 1. 2, 1356a1 ff., 1. 9, 1366b23 ff., on προαίρεσις and πράξις, 1. 9, 1367b22 ff.; cf. 2. 21, 1395b11 ff., 3. 16, 1417a16 ff.

²⁴ 1. 2, 1356a14–16, 2. 1, 1377b20 ff.

²⁵ There are at least two qualifications to be made to this claim (cf. also n. 32 below). One is that the analysis of the *pathē* in *Rh.* 2. 2 ff. is clearly meant to provide the speaker with guidelines about which emotions he can plausibly express, e.g. anger or indignation, as regards his treatment at the hands of others. Nevertheless, it is the arousal of such emotions in the audience that Aristotle stresses, e.g. 2. 2, 1380a1–5, 2. 3, 1380b31–4 and the conclusion in 2. 11, 1388b29–30. It is true, also, that the section 2. 12–17 characterizes the *ēthē* of different sections of the potential audience (young, old, rich, poor). But the point of considering the typical attitudes and emotional inclinations (κατὰ τὰ πάθη 2. 12, 1388b31) of these groups is to enable the speaker to assimilate his attitudes to theirs and so more effectively play on their emotions. Their *ēthē* are not being considered from the same standpoint as the (individual, moral) *ēthos* of the speaker: cf. E. M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867), pp. 108–18; Wilhelm Süss, *Ethos, Studien zur Älteren Griechischen Rhetorik* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), pp. 152 ff.; George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 91–4; Friedrich Solmsen, 'Aristotle and Cicero on the orator's playing upon the feelings', *CP* 33 (1938), 390 ff.; Schütrumpf, op. cit. pp. 28 ff.

²⁶ 1. 2, 1356a4–13, 2. 1, 1377b20–1378a5.

²⁷ For exceptions, see n. 32 below.

²⁸ Attic law distinguished, at least in the case of homicide, between acts committed ἐκ προνοίας, from forethought, and those not so committed; cf. T. H. Irwin, 'Reason and responsibility in Aristotle', in *Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), pp. 119–20 and refs. Therefore, one might have expected Aristotle to discuss the defence that one acted, in such cases, from *pathos* and not from a πρόνοια that expressed one's

As we have seen, we find the same overall approach to *ēthos* and *pathos* in the *Poetics* also; but it is not so obviously appropriate there. Plato had argued, with some plausibility, that tragic characters typically act and speak in the grip of emotion. Aristotle notoriously reacted against this claim. But his own theory of tragic *hamartia*, as I have suggested, could reasonably have been presented in terms of the case of a man of good *ēthos* acting under the impact of *pathos*. At the very least, the question of the possible interplay between *ēthos* and *pathos* in the tragic figure would seem a relevant topic for Aristotle to discuss; but we find no such discussion in the *Poetics*.²⁹ Since Aristotle's approach is more obviously suitable to rhetorical theory than tragic, it is worth considering if the *Poetics* has been influenced by the *Rhetoric* on this point. The only explicit reference to the *Rhetoric* in the *Poetics* comes in chapter nineteen, where Aristotle directs his reader to the other treatise for fuller treatment of 'thought' (*dianoia*). The province of 'thought' turns out to be an extensive one, consisting of 'all the effects which are to be produced through language' (*Poet.* 19, 1456a 37–8). As Aristotle develops this point, it becomes clear that he has in mind the *Rhetoric*'s schema of three kinds of proof, logical, ethical and emotional; and that he imagines the tragic figure, like the public speaker, using discourse for the purpose of *τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον κ.τ.λ.*³⁰ The speeches of the tragic figures, in turn, are part of a larger 'rhetoric', including the organization of the plot and physical acts and gestures, by which the playwright makes the actions of the play seem *ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα* to his audience.³¹ Here both the tragic figure and the playwright are described in quasi-rhetorical terms, as operating on the minds and emotions of their listeners; and this dovetails with Aristotle's general tendency to describe the tragic character as one who produces emotion in others rather than one who is affected by emotion himself.

ēthos, e.g. in his discussion of the motives of wrongdoing, *Rh.* 1. 10–12. But there seems not to be any such discussion, despite his interest in such topics in the ethical writings; cf. Irwin, 120 ff.

²⁹ For Plato's views see *Resp.* 603c ff.; and for Aristotle's response see refs. in n. 6 and n. 17 above. The clearest account of this aspect of the debate between Plato and Aristotle is given by Else in *The Structure and Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic*, *AHAW* (1972) esp. pp. 44–5. (Else's account is not vitiated by his controversial view that the relevant section of Book 10 of the *Republic* is a separate, late composition, written in response to an Aristotelian proto-*Poetics*, pp. 55–7). Aristotle's determination to avoid the Platonic position on this question is probably his strongest motive for avoiding discussion of *pathos* in tragic figures, a point I pursue further in an article forthcoming in *Poetics Today*, 'The question of character and personality in Greek Tragedy'.

³⁰ cf. *Poet.* 19, 1456a 37–b2, and *Rh.* 1. 2, 1356a 1 ff. Aristotle's failure, in the *Poetics* passage, to mention the ethical proof probably reflects his sense that he has dealt with *ēthos* elsewhere (e.g. in ch. 15) and is concerned only with *dianoia* here; cf. Else, p. 563. There are, in any case, clear parallels between the treatment of *ēthos* in the two treatises; cf. e.g. *Poet.* 6, 1450b 8–12, 15, 1454a 16–19, with *Rh.* 1. 2, 1356a 1–13, 2. 21, 1395b 11–19, 3. 16, 1417a 16 ff. (including the famous discussion of Antigone). See further A. M. Dale, 'Ethos and Dianoia: "character" and "thought" in Aristotle's *Poetics*', *AUMLA* 11 (1959), 3 ff., esp. pp. 11–16, who argues strongly for rhetorical influence on Aristotle's dramatic theory; and Else, pp. 565–6, who maintains that Aristotle saw the parallels between the two areas but also advocated that the differences be recognized as well.

³¹ Here I am trying to paraphrase the problematic sentence in 1456b 2–7, drawing on the exegesis of Bywater, Else and Lucas, *ad loc.*; cf. M. E. Hubbard's note on her translation of the *Poetics*, in *Ancient Literary Criticism*, ed. Russell and Winterbottom, pp. 116–17, n. 5. In the Greek of 1456a 37–b 7, Aristotle does not in fact distinguish as clearly as I have done between the emotional effect the characters have on each other (or the audience) and the emotional effect the dramatist has on the audience; cf. the tendency to conflate these two effects in ch. 17, 1455a 22 ff., discussed above.

This passage does not prove that this tendency in Aristotle's tragic theory is derived wholly from the *Rhetoric*. But it does suggest that, on the question of character and emotion, rhetorical parallels reinforce existing inclinations in his tragic theory.

In the *Rhetoric*, there are some exceptions to this general tendency in Aristotle's approach, and they occur in his discussion of style. Aristotle discusses cases where it is useful for the speaker to present himself as being in an emotional state – that of anger, for instance, or indignation. In such contexts, Aristotle talks about 'emotional' style, or about forms of expression (such as maxims or narrative) used 'emotionally'. However, these passages constitute only a partial exception to Aristotle's usual approach, because he has primarily in mind the production of a certain effect on the audience, and he thinks this can be most successfully brought about by the speaker's expression of the emotional reactions he wants to induce in the listener.³² The idea that there are distinctive types of 'emotional' or 'ethical' style becomes a very important one in later rhetorical theory. The idea makes an appearance in Aristotle, but it is not very fully developed. It turns out to be the content, not the wording, that makes the use of narrative or maxims 'ethical' or 'emotional', by allowing a speaker to portray his own good *ēthos* (or his opponent's bad *ēthos*), or by giving grounds for an appropriate emotional reaction from the audience.³³ In one passage, however, Aristotle does describe style (*lexis*) as being 'ethical' or 'emotional' in itself. 'Emotional' style is typified by the presence of 'compound words and many epithets and unusual terms' (a comment that anticipates the later association of the 'emotional' with the 'grand' style). 'Ethical' style is described (in a variation of his normal usage) as relating to such external features of 'character' as age, sex, nationality or degree of education; these are, presumably, features that can be conspicuously brought out in vocabulary or phrasing.³⁴

Our evidence for the rhetorical handbooks of the Hellenistic period is poor; but, to judge from the use of the *ēthos/pathos* contrast in the treatise of Demetrius, *On Style*, there is little development from Aristotle's usage.³⁵ In Cicero, however, and in the Augustan critic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, we find certain interesting developments, notably in the association of *ēthos* and *pathos* with particular styles of speech. Cicero's only explicit reference to the distinction in the rhetorical works comes in *Orator* (128), where he mentions two aspects of the orator's art which are distinguished

³² 3. 21, 1395a23–4, ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος κ.τ.λ. 3. 7, 1408a16, παθητικὴ δὲ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾗ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξεις κ.τ.λ., 1408a23–4, συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μὴ θέν λέγῃ. In 3. 16, 1417a36–7, τῶν παθητικῶν has a rather different sense, 'acts expressive of emotion', where the emotions are those of the speaker's opponent. Cf. Cope–Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1877), *ad loc.*

³³ See, e.g., 2. 21, 1395a20–34, 3. 16, 1417a16–b10, 3. 17, 1418a12–21. Cf. also *ēthikos logos* (1. 8, 1366a8–16, 2. 18, 1391b25–7), i.e. *logos* designed to show that the *ēthos* of the speaker is sympathetic to that of the audience in political attitudes (cf. n. 25 above).

³⁴ 3. 7, 1408a10–b20, esp. a25–32 and b11–20. For this kind of *ēthos*, cf. *Poet.* 15, 1459a19–24. The passage on 'ethical' style is sometimes taken to refer to the speech-maker's attempt to make the speech verbally suitable for the client in question; see, e.g., Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, pp. 91–2. However, as Elaine Fantham points out, 'women and foreigners' (Aristotle's examples here) 'could not plead their own cases, so Aristotle cannot be discussing how to characterize a client, but rather how to include narrative quotations in the style of those quoted', 'Ciceronian *Conciliare* and Aristotelian *Ethos*', *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 262–75, quotation from p. 272.

³⁵ *Eloc.* 28. 'Ομοιοτέλευτα are not useful for *pathos* and *ēthos*, for both of these require simplicity and naturalness. The meaning of *ēthos* is not explained, but *pathos* is clearly associated with the excitation of emotions such as grief. For authorship and date of this treatise, see *Ancient Literary Criticism*, ed. Russell and Winterbottom, p. 172.

by function and by a style that is appropriate to the function. The *ēthikon* aspect is *ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum*; in style, it is *come*, *iucundum*, *ad benevolentiam conciliandam paratum*. The *pathētikon* aspect is the one *quo perturbantur animi et concitantur*; in style, it is *vehemens*, *incensum*, *incitatum*, *quo causae eripiuntur*. Here Cicero, more fully than Aristotle, associates 'ethical' and 'emotional' aspects with two distinct oratorical styles. In fact, he seems to associate them with two of the three styles which were commonly distinguished in post-Aristotelian rhetoric, namely the 'middle' and the 'grand', whose functions Cicero designated earlier in *Orator* as being *delectare* and *movere* (or *flectere*).³⁶ In other respects, his use of the distinction seems to be Aristotelian. *Pathos* (or the *pathētikon* aspect) is clearly associated with the production of emotions in the audience. The function of the *ēthikon* aspect is less clearly described (*ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum*). Does Cicero have in mind the portrayal of the personal qualities and style of life of the client (or the advocate), or the adaptation of the speech to appeal to the natural responses and sentiments of audiences in a wide variety of contexts? And how is the style he mentions (*come*, *iucundum*) suitable for the required function? These points, and Cicero's general approach to this area, can be clarified by study of a fuller discussion in an earlier work, *De Oratore*, which is parallel to this passage in a number of respects.³⁷

In Book Two of *De Oratore*, Cicero gives an account of the main tasks of the orator which seems to be based on Aristotle's schema of the three types of 'technical' proof (that is, the reasoning expressed or implied in the speech, *ēthos*, and *pathos*), although the actual terms, *ēthos* and *pathos*, are not employed.³⁸ Cicero's treatment of character and emotion follows broadly Aristotelian lines; although a number of differences emerge as a result of his stronger interest in style and the fact that Cicero, unlike Aristotle, envisages a situation in which the advocate and client are two different people. In the section on character, Cicero stresses the presentation of the client as a man of good character, and his opponent as the opposite; he also stresses the presentation of the advocate as a man of good character. The advocate, of course, is presenting himself, and Cicero emphasizes the value of style in this respect. The right kind of style (*placida*, *summissa*, *lenis*) is not only effective in gaining the audience's trust in the orator's appraisals of character (*quae maxime commendat reos*, etc., 2. 183–4). It is also, in itself, an index of good character: *genere enim quodam sententiarum et genere verborum, adhibita etiam actione leni facilitatemque significante efficitur ut probi, ut bene morati, ut boni viri esse videantur*.³⁹ Cicero clearly sees a close

³⁶ See 69: *quot officia oratoris tot sunt genera dicendi... modicum in delectando* (cf. *iucundum*, 128); ('grand') *vehemens in flectendo; in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est* (cf. *in quo uno regnat oratio*, 128). See further 97–9: ('grand') *quae cursu magno sonituque ferretur*, etc. (cf. *rapide fertur*, 128), *tractare animos... permovere* (cf. *quo perturbantur animi et concitantur*, 128), *ardens... inflammare* (cf. *incensum*, 128); *medius suavis* (cf. 91–2 and *iucundum*, 128). On Cicero and the three styles, see A. E. Douglas, 'A Ciceronian contribution to rhetorical theory', *Eranos* 55 (1957), 18–26.

³⁷ cf. Fantham, op. cit. p. 262. Both the speaker-related and the audience-related functions of *ēthikon* have Aristotelian parallels (cf. nn. 23, 25 and 33 above). The link between the two treatises is particularly clear at *De Or.* 2. 213 (cf. *Orat.* 128), esp. *hoc [genus], quod ad vitam et mores accommodatur*. In *De Or.* it is clear (from 2. 182–4) that, in this phrase, Cicero primarily has in mind the favourable portrayal of the client (and advocate), though he also thinks this will guarantee a favourable response from the audience; cf. n. 41 below.

³⁸ See *De Or.* 2. 115, 121, and Arist. *Rh.* 1. 2, 1356a1 ff.; the *ēthos*-passage is *De Or.* 182–4; the *pathos*-passage is 2. 185–215. Cf. Fantham, op. cit. pp. 262 ff.; Solmsen, op. cit. pp. 396–402; Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, 1972), pp. 222–3.

³⁹ cf. *lenitas vocis, vultus pudoris significatio, verborum comitas* (2. 182); *tantum autem efficitur*

connection between the self-presentation of the speaker (in part, through style of speech) and the speaker's portrayal of his client's excellence of character. Indeed, at one point he slides without warning from one topic to the other (in the sentence *facilitatis...ex contrario conferenda*, in 2. 182). This may be taken as a sign of carelessness or intellectual confusion; but it also reflects the practical importance, in the Roman courtroom, of the orator's self-presentation as a means of gaining credibility for his client, for whom, in theory at least, his advocacy was a personal favour.⁴⁰

Cicero describes the rhetorical function of this character-presentation as *conciliare ad benevolentiam* (contrasted with the other two oratorical functions, *docere* and *movere*). In this respect, like Aristotle, he regards the presentation of good *ēthos* as being a means of working on the *pathē* of the audience.⁴¹ Like Aristotle, he also treats directly, and at length, the subject of arousing the appropriate emotions in the audience (2. 185–215). Cicero stresses here, as in the section on character, the importance of adopting the appropriate type of speech for arousing emotions in the audience (*acris* and *vehemens* rather than *placida* and *lenis*).⁴² He also stresses, much more than Aristotle, the idea that an orator should himself express, with some intensity, the emotions he wants to induce in others, and that he should (like a good actor or dramatist) work up in himself the emotions he wants to express.⁴³ This difference of emphasis may partly derive from the fact that Cicero has the advocate in mind, not the person conducting his own defence, as Aristotle has. The advocate, since he is not the person directly involved, needs to stimulate in himself the appropriate emotions, such as anger or indignation. And, since his feelings are

sensu quodam ac ratione dicendi, ut quasi mores oratoris effingat oratio (2. 184). On the link presupposed here between style, esp. verbal style, and socially approved qualities of character, see Fantham, op. cit. p. 263, on *lenitas*, and Friedrich Zucker, 'Ἀνθηθοποιήτος, Eine semasiologische Untersuchung aus der antiken Rhetorik und Ethik', in *Semantica, Rhetorica, Ethica. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1963), 33 ff.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., *De Or.* 2. 192, 200–1, and cf. Kennedy, 'The rhetoric of advocacy in Greece and Rome', *AJP* 89 (1968), 419–36, esp. 428–35. Fantham, however, sees confusion of thought in Cicero, resulting from an uncritical reproduction of Aristotle's *ēthos*-theory, in which the advocate-client distinction played no part; op. cit. pp. 264–6, 271–3.

⁴¹ *De Or.* 2. 182, cf. 2. 114–15 and Arist. refs. in n. 26 above. In Cicero's later rhetorical works, the function of *conciliare* tends to be replaced by *delectare* (see *Or.* 69, and cf. Fantham, op. cit. pp. 273–5). Fantham points out that in the later stages of Cicero's discussion (*De Or.* 2. 212, 216), the distinction between *conciliare* and *movere* (and the distinction between the correlated styles) tends to merge: 'Conciliatio has here become merely a label for one section of *movere*' (Fantham, op. cit. p. 267). This development may help to explain why Quintilian presents *ēthos* and *pathos* as alternative types of emotional modes for the orator to use, indeed as two different types or levels of emotion (see discussion below).

⁴² *De Or.* 2. 183; cf. 211–12. In 2. 128–9, three stylistic qualities are linked with three oratorical functions (*acumen* with *docere*, *lenitas* with *conciliare*, *vis* with *concitare*). This is not quite identical with the more fully elaborated system of three styles and functions given in *Orat.* 69 ff.; Cicero there seems to have in mind stylistic attractiveness (*suavitas*), aimed at pleasing (*delectare*), rather than gentleness of tone (*lenitas*), aimed at winning over (*commendare*); cf. nn. 36 and 41 above. However, the distinction is a fine one; character should be presented *suaviter* as well as *actione leni* in *De Or.* 2. 184, and in *Orat.* 128 the 'ethical' style should be pleasing (*iucundum*) as well as winning (*come...ad benevolentiam conciliandam paratum*). In general, it seems fair to say that Cicero associates character-presentation with some version of the middle style, and associates emotion, consistently, with the grand and intense style, both in *De Or.* and in *Orat.*

⁴³ 2. 189 ff. The passage is closer to Arist. *Poet.* 17 (note the reference to the Platonic 'mad' or 'inspired' poet in 2. 194); cf. *Poet.* 1454a32–4, and Lucas, note on 55a32. Cf. Hor. *Ars P.* 102–3, *si vis me flere, dolendum est / primum ipsi tibi*, and on the question of the orator's sincerity in these emotional states see C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 186.

sympathetic and not self-related, he can let himself go in emotional expression, without reflecting badly on his character (or that of his client) by seeming emotionally uncontrolled.

In the rhetorical writings of the Augustan Greek critic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the association of *ēthos* and *pathos* with particular oratorical styles is also marked. *ῥηθικὴ λέξις*, for instance, while not losing its Aristotelian associations with a diction that is true to type, and that conveys good character, is also commonly associated with stylistic qualities such as simplicity and sweetness.⁴⁴ In a discussion of Demosthenes, for example, and his unique power to combine the two styles, Dionysius associates the 'ethical' style with these qualities, *λιτὴν, ἀπέριττον, συνήθη, ἀληθινήν, ἰλαράν, ἀναιμένην, ἡδέϊαν*; and the 'emotional' with these qualities, *μεγαλοπρεπή, περιττήν, ἐξηλλαγμένην, πανηγυρικὴν, αὐστηράν, σύντονον, πικράν*.⁴⁵ A further development from Aristotelian usage is evident in Dionysius too. In Aristotle, *ēthos* was associated with the self-presentation of the speaker, *pathos* with the impact on the audience. In Dionysius, both *ēthos* and *pathos* are sometimes described as emotional effects, of different types, which the orator aims to induce in the audience. In contrasting Thucydides' and Lysias' style, Dionysius says:

ἡ μὲν γὰρ καταπλήξασθαι δύναται τὴν διάνοιαν, ἡ δὲ ἡδύναι, καὶ ἡ μὲν συστρέφει καὶ συντείνει τὸν νοῦν, ἡ δὲ ἀνείναι καὶ μαλάξαι, καὶ εἰς πάθος ἐκείνη προαγαγεῖν, εἰς δὲ ἥθος αὐτὴ καταστήσει.⁴⁶

This type of usage gives a new meaning to the terms *ēthos* and *pathos*, namely the contrasting emotional effects produced in an audience by the 'ethical' and 'emotional' styles. However, in Dionysius, at least, this meaning is not unconnected with the Aristotelian associations of the words. This comes out in the contrast between the effect on an audience of Isocrates and Demosthenes:

ὅταν μὲν τινα τῶν Ἰσοκράτους ἀναγινώσκω λόγων, ἐν ᾗθι σπουδαῖος γίνομαι καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐσταθὲς ἔχω τῆς γνώμης. . . ὅταν δὲ <τῶν> Δημοσθένους τινὰ λάβω λόγων, ἐνθουσιῶ τε καὶ δεῦρο κᾶκείσε ἄγομαι, πάθος ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλαμβάνων, ἀπιστῶν, ἀγωνιῶν, δεδιώς, καταφρονῶν, μισῶν, ἐλεῶν, εὐνοῶν, ὀργιζόμενος, φθονῶν, ἅπαντα τὰ πάθη μεταλαμβάνων, ὅσα κρατεῖν πέφυκεν ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης.⁴⁷

The extension of *ēthos* to an effect produced in the listener (putting him in the state of mind to respond to the *ēthos* of the speaker) is none the less a marked development from Aristotelian usage.

There is further development in the *ēthos/pathos* distinction in an important but confusing discussion in Quintilian (6. 2). On the face of it, this account is, in comparison with earlier accounts, simply muddled.⁴⁸ We find virtually all the senses allocated in previous discussions to *ēthos* and *pathos*, and the ethical and emotional styles,

⁴⁴ For the Aristotelian usages cf. nn. 33–4 above. For *ēthos* in Dionysius, see J. F. Lockwood, 'HΘΙΚΗ ΛΕΞΙΣ and Dinarchus', *CQ* 23 (1929), 181–5.

⁴⁵ D.H., *Opuscula*, ed. H. Usener and L. Radermacher (Leipzig, 1899), 1. 143, *Dem.* 8; *Opuscula*, vols. 1–2 (ed. Usener–Radermacher) = D.H. Teubner vols. 5–6. Cf. D.H., *Comp.* 11. 37, for a similar list of contrasted qualities, discussed by D. A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity* (London, 1981), pp. 133–5.

⁴⁶ *Dem.* 2, Usener–Radermacher, 1. 131; cf. *Dem.* 43, Usener–Radermacher, 1. 224. Cf. Lockwood's comment on *Dem.* 22 (see n. 47 below), on *ēthos*: 'the reference is to the effect on the hearer's mental outlook. Isocrates is like a military band; he makes you stick out your chest and think yourself "no end of a fellow"' (op. cit. p. 182 n. 6).

⁴⁷ *Dem.* 22, Usener–Radermacher, 1. 176. For *ēthos/pathos* used in a quite Aristotelian way, see *Dem.* 18, Usener–Radermacher, 1. 166.

⁴⁸ cf. Solmsen, op. cit. pp. 395–6; Zucker, op. cit. p. 43; Keuls, op. cit. p. 99 n. 37.

together with associated themes, such as the importance of the speaker's emotional involvement in his speech, and of vividness in re-creating the relevant events.⁴⁹ But we seem to find none of the clarifying distinctions that give order to these senses, such as Aristotle's distinction between portrayal of *ēthos* (in the speaker) and production of *pathos* (in the audience). Yet Quintilian's account is not quite as muddled as it seems, and is essentially a development of Cicero's approach in the *Orator* and *De Oratore*.

Cicero, particularly in *De Oratore*, connects the presentation of good character, in advocate and client, with a calm emotional mode (*lenitas*), and with the appropriate oratorical style to express this mode. Quintilian's account of *ēthos* does much the same, without distinguishing so clearly the various elements involved, and without explaining their interconnections.⁵⁰ In his treatment of emotion in *De Oratore*, Cicero, despite his interest in the orator's emotional self-involvement, retained the Aristotelian focus on the attempt to arouse the emotions of the audience.⁵¹ Quintilian has some sense of this, as any orator must.⁵² But he tends to treat *pathos* as being closely parallel to *ēthos*, as an element in the orator's repertoire of techniques, rather than an effect the orator is trying to produce. In fact, he treats *ēthos* and *pathos* as alternative emotional modes for the orator to use (the one calm and composed, the other excited and disturbed). Each mode is suitable for the depiction and expression of different types of attitude or relationship (for instance, moderate *caritas*, on the one hand, and passionate *amor* on the other); and each emotional mode is correlated with different stylistic indicators.⁵³ His treatment of *ēthos* and *pathos* as alternative emotional modes explains what is otherwise puzzling, namely his description of both of them as different types of emotion. His distinction is not based on any psychological theory about character and emotion, but on his awareness of the various alternative modes available to the orator.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ e.g. under *ēthos* we find the long-standing association with good character and ethics (6. 2. 8, 11, 13, 18); with depiction of types, such as *rusticos*, 6. 2. 17, cf. 1. 9. 3, though not re-creation of their style, as in Arist. *Rh.* 3, 7, 1408a25 ff., cf. n. 34 above. We also find the association of *ēthos* with a 'calm' style, 6. 2. 13, identified with the 'middle' style, 6. 2. 19, as in Cicero; cf. n. 42 above. For his treatment of *pathos*, cf. nn. 52–3 below. For the theme of the speaker's emotional self-involvement, cf. 6. 2. 25 ff., including the reference to actors, 35, and Cic. *De Or.* 2. 189 ff.; for the link between emotional self-involvement and visualization, cf. 6. 2. 29 ff., Arist. *Poet.* 17, 1455a22–34, and n. 20 above.

⁵⁰ In *De Or.* 2. 182–4, the portrayal of good character is linked with a calm emotional mode (and with certain stylistic features, 2. 212–14), but these connections are argued for. In Quintilian, 6. 2. 10–19, the connections are assumed, and the various themes run into each other without clear demarcation.

⁵¹ *De Or.* 2. 178, 185, 189 ff., 206 ff.

⁵² The discussion of *ēthos* and *pathos* begins with this concern (6. 2. 1–7); but in his detailed discussion of *pathos* as well as *ēthos* his attention is on the orator, and his selection of the appropriate mode, rather than the impact on the audience (cf. refs. in n. 53 below; exceptions include comments in 6. 2. 9, *ad perturbationem... praevalere*, and 6. 2. 20–1, a brief attempt to distinguish the emotions we feel ourselves and those we induce in others). The topic of the emotional appeal to the audience is resumed in 6. 2. 23 ff., in discussing *δείνωσις* and *visiones*.

⁵³ 6. 2. 9 (*concitatos... vehementer commotos, mitesque atque compositos*); 6. 2. 12 (*amor and caritas*; cf. 6. 2. 17); stylistic indicators in 6. 2. 19–24. In Cic. *Orat.* 128, *ēthikon* and *pathētikon* could also be interpreted (and perhaps were interpreted by Quint.) as oratorical-emotional modes of this kind (cf. n. 41 above, on *De Or.* 2. 212, 216).

⁵⁴ 6. 2. 9, more and less violent emotions; 6. 2. 12, *ēthos* and *pathos* differ only in degree, cf. 6. 2. 17. Conceivably, the *quidam* who maintained that *ēthos* was *perpetuum*, while *pathos* was *temporale*, had psychological theory in mind; cf. Arist. *EN* 2. 5, *EE* 2. 2. But for Quintilian the concern is a practical one, relating to the emotional level of the speech; cf. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, pp. 505–6, and for the underlying rhetorical issue Solmsen, op. cit. esp. pp. 400–1.

We are now in a better position to interpret Quintilian's comparison of *ēthos* to comedy and *pathos* to tragedy (6. 2. 20). What he presumably has in mind, in mentioning these genres, is that they differ in the type of human situation they present (tragedy, like *pathos*, is 'almost wholly concerned with anger, hatred, fear, envy, pity'), in their emotional mode, and in the styles used to convey these.⁵⁵ His association of *ēthos* with comedy makes rather more sense for Quintilian than it does for Aristotle (who also, as we saw, seemed to associate them).⁵⁶ For the kind of comedy Quintilian has in mind is Menandrian 'new' comedy and its Roman adaptations rather than Aristophanes. And in this comic tradition we find the portrayal of stock types (including stock ethical types), the exploration of moral themes, the portrayal of relatively reasonable human relationships, and the mild and unelaborate style Quintilian associates with *ēthos*.⁵⁷ Given the brevity of Quintilian's comment, and his generally unanalytic framework, there is little further we can make of his comment. But it is interesting, none the less, to note his demarcation of these two stylistic-emotional modes, and his ready assimilation of comedy to *ēthos* and tragedy to *pathos*.⁵⁸

Longinus' remarks on *ēthos* and *pathos* in relation to Homer are more developed and suggestive. Before turning to these, however, it is worth considering the place of *ēthos* and *pathos* in the overall approach of the treatise *On the Sublime*. Longinus' project is interestingly different from that of the other rhetorical critics we have mentioned, in that he does not aim to analyse the whole of rhetorical technique, including its various available styles, but to describe the quality that makes writing great, both in rhetoric and literature generally (1. 3). However, his characterization of τὸ ὑψος (the elevated or sublime) has features in common with the 'grand' style of rhetorical criticism, in particular the link with *pathos*.⁵⁹ Indeed, his initial presentation of this quality identifies it strongly with *pathos* and the 'emotional' style rather than *ēthos* and the 'ethical' style.

οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθῶ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντῃ δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν αἰεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον.⁶⁰

As we have seen, *pathos* is a quality studied fully and highly valued in the rhetorical tradition. It is typically conceived (at least in post-Aristotelian rhetoricians such as Cicero, Quintilian and Dionysius) as something induced, partly self-induced, in the orator-composer and then communicated through an appropriate style to the

⁵⁵ cf. Hor. *Ars P.* 89 ff. for a similar association of intense emotion and high style with tragedy, rather than comedy (despite exceptions). Cf. Brink, op. cit. ii pp. 174 ff. and refs., esp. note on l. 89, and Donatus' comment that Terence *et morem (= ēthos) retinuit, ut comoediam scriberet, et temperavit affectum (= pathos), ne in tragoediam transiliret*.

⁵⁶ At least, the *Odyssey* is associated both with comedy (13, 1453a32–9) and with *ēthos* (24, 1459b13–16); cf. n. 16 above.

⁵⁷ See Quint. 6. 2. 8–19; compare the *ēthe*, or type-portraits of *rusticos, superstitiosos, avaros, timidos* (6. 2. 17), with the portrayal of *personae*, such as *rusticorum, irascentium, deprecantium, mitium, asperorum*, ascribed to Menander in 10. 1. 71. For moral themes, see e.g. Men. *Dys.*, Ter. *Ad.* On Menander's style, see Quint. 10. 1. 69; cf. Plu. *Mor.* 853d–e.

⁵⁸ In Quint. 10. 1. 68, Euripides is described as *in affectibus mirus*, esp. *miseratione*. In 6. 2. 35, he speaks of actors as inflaming our emotions *falsis affectibus* (and as themselves *flentes* after a performance), but he mentions *comoedos* here as well as (tragic) *histriones*. Cf. n. 55 above.

⁵⁹ cf. 'Longinus', *On the Sublime*, ed. D. A. Russell (Oxford, 1964), xxxvi–ii. (See further Russell's 'Longinus Revisited', *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981), 72–86, on the place of *pathos* in the overall strategy of the treatise.) All subsequent refs. to 'Russell' denote his edn of 'Longinus', unless otherwise specified.

⁶⁰ 1. 4. Cf. the contrast of ethical/emotional styles in Cic. *Orat.* 128, D.H., *Dem.* 8, Usener–Radermacher, 1. 143.

audience.⁶¹ This is how Longinus conceives *pathos* too, though (since he also considers epic, drama and lyric) he also envisages the author communicating *pathos* through impersonated figures or through a self-portraying lyric poem.⁶²

Let us look first at the theme of *pathos* in the work, and then at the *ēthos/pathos* contrast. As I have suggested, Longinus conceives *pathos* as something that originates in the writer, which gives power to the writing (including the impersonation of human figures) and is communicated to the reader through technical devices suited for the purpose. At all stages, Longinus emphasizes experiences such as *ἔκστασις*, *ἐκπληξίς*, *ἐνθουσιασμός*. The writer, the represented figure, the audience, are all 'taken out of themselves' by the communicated emotional power of the sublime. A prime *πηγή* for *ὑψηγορία* is *τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν πάθος* (8. 1). Nothing is so productive of *μεγαλήγορον* as *τὸ γενναῖον πάθος... ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μανίας τινὸς καὶ πνεύματος ἐνθουσιαστικῶς ἐκπνέον καὶ οἰονεὶ φοιβάζον τοὺς λόγους* (8. 4). Longinus here takes the traditional idea of the 'inspired' poet and generalizes it into a paradigm for all great writing, in poetry and prose. He also takes the relatively prosaic theme of imitation of previous writers and presents this in the same terms. Many writers *ἁλλοτρίῳ θεοφοροῦνται πνεύματι* like the Pythian prophetess at Delphi; so Plato, for instance, *ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὐτὸν μυρίας ὄσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος*.⁶³ He develops the theme treated by Quintilian, of visual imagination (*φαντασία*), as a means by which the writer can make a situation real to himself, can feel the appropriate emotions, and can communicate those emotions through words to the audience.⁶⁴ Characteristically, the emotional effect he is interested in, at least in poetry, is *ἐκπληξίς*, and his examples focus on the presentation of people in the grip of madness (or love) by Euripides, and on his capacity to make the audience see the Furies that the poet himself saw and that he imagined his dramatic figure seeing.⁶⁵ In rhetoric, Longinus stresses clarity (*ἐνάργεια*) rather than astonishment as the desired effect on the reader; though he also envisages that vivid rhetoric *οὐ πείθει τὸν ἀκροατὴν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δουλοῦται*.⁶⁶

Longinus, like other rhetorical writers, associates the communication of *pathos*, and *ῥψος*, with certain stylistic features (8. 1, 16. 1). But his attitude is ambivalent on this point. On the one hand he emphasizes, particularly in his discussion of figures, how abnormalities of expression can bring a kind of jagged urgency to the speech, and thus catch the listener up in the *pathos* the speaker is expressing.⁶⁷ On the other hand, he is aware that, if the listener realizes that he is being 'ambushed' by technique, he will be insulated from the desired emotional effect (17. 1). Yet he thinks that *τὸ ῥψος καὶ*

⁶¹ In Aristotle, as we saw, *pathos* was primarily associated, in the *Rhetoric*, with the impact on the audience, except in discussion of the emotional style; cf. n. 32 above. In *Poet.* 17, Aristotle develops the theme of emotional self-involvement in the writer that becomes a dominant theme in the orators; cf. nn. 20–1 above, and Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity*, pp. 81–2.

⁶² See esp. 9. 10 ff. (Homer), 10 (Sappho), 15 (Euripides). Cf. discussion below.

⁶³ 13. 2–3; cf. Russell, notes *ad loc.* The process is sometimes described more prosaically: it resembles 'the reproduction of good character (*ἡθῶν*) in statues and works of art', 13. 4; cf. Russell, *ad loc.*

⁶⁴ 15; cf. Russell, notes *ad loc.*, Quint. 6. 2. 25–36, nn. 20, 21, 47 above.

⁶⁵ 15. 1–8. In 15. 2 (as in Arist. *Poet.* 17), the process is depicted rather as a relationship between writer and audience, though at 15. 8 the role (and the imagined viewpoint) of the dramatic character is brought in (Orestes *φαντάζεται ταῦθ' ὅτι μαίνεται*); cf. Quint. 6. 2. 32 and n. 20 above. Euripides is typically seen as the master of *pathos*; cf. Quint. 10. 1. 68, in *adfectibus miris*. The theme goes back to Arist. *Poet.* 13, 1453a23–30; whereas Sophocles is the master of *ēthos*, 25, 1460b33–5, 3, 1448a25–8.

⁶⁶ 15. 2, 15. 9, 15. 11 (*ἐκπληκτικὸν* in rhetorical visualization); cf. Russell, note on 15. 2.

⁶⁷ See 18–22, 25–7; cf. 10. 5–6 and 39. 3.

πάθος can serve as an ἀλέξημα τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ σχηματίζειν ὑπονοίας. The listener is dazzled by τῷ φωτὶ αὐτῷ of the orator's emotional power, which, somehow, 'shows up above' the figures καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἐπισκιάζει καὶ οἶον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ.⁶⁸ In the right hands – that is, in a speaker with the requisite emotional power – these figures render speeches παθητικωτέρους and hence conducive to sublimity; for πάθος... ὕψους μετέχει τοσοῦτον, ὅποσον ἦθος ἡδονῆς.⁶⁹

Given the close association of *pathos* with ὕψος, and Longinus' interest in the 'ecstatic' and paranormal, his preference of *pathos* to *ēthos* is unsurprising. The comparison of Hypereides to Demosthenes is virtually a comparison of *ēthos* to *pathos*, and Demosthenes comes out better. Hypereides has τό τε ἡθικόν... μετὰ γλυκύτητος, which, together with qualities such as irony, 'Attic salt' and τὸ κωμικόν, give his speeches ἀμίμητον... ἐπαφρόδιτον.⁷⁰ Demosthenes, by contrast, is ἀνηθοποίητος, ἀδιάχυτος, and lacks virtually all the qualities Hypereides has.⁷¹ None the less, Demosthenes has ὑψηγορίας τόνον, ἔμψυχα πάθη, quasi-divine gifts that place him in another, higher category. Indeed, he is almost more than god-like; it would be easier to lift up one's eyes in the face of thunderbolts than τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις ἐκείνου πάθεισιν.⁷²

This general preference of *pathos* to *ēthos* comes out strongly in Longinus' discussion of Homer, and the comparison of the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey*. Here, as elsewhere, *pathos* is conceived as a quality in the author, which is then communicated to the audience through the expressive power of his dialogue and narrative. The poet is able εἰς τὰ ἡρωικὰ μεγέθη συνεμβάινειν, and to give them the lines that make one say: ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ πάθος Αἴαντος.⁷³ Longinus compares Homer to a favouring breeze, who blows life into his battles. Perhaps he has in mind the kind of god-like power Zeus οὐριος has; he uses a Homeric simile, in which Hector is compared to the war-god Ares, to convey the quasi-divine power with which Homer μαίνεται.⁷⁴ Longinus claims the *Iliad* was composed when his 'wind' or

⁶⁸ 17. 2; cf. 32. 4: τὰ... σφοδρὰ πάθη καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὕψος... constitute τινὰ ἀλεξιφάρμακα, by sweeping the listener along τῷ ῥοθίῳ τῆς φορᾶς, and 38. 5. Cf. William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism: a short History* (New York, 1957), pp. 100–1, 103–5.

⁶⁹ 29. 2; cf. Russell, *ad loc.* and pp. xxx ff. In the last clause, ὕψος and ἡδονή seem to be the desired effects, *pathos* and *ēthos* the contributory means. *ēthos* is hard to render properly here; Russell suggests 'characterization' (note *ad loc.*), but this may be too specific. Longinus may have in mind the various elements, attractive character, calm emotional tenor, sweet style, that make the 'ethical' style a pleasant one.

⁷⁰ 34. 2. Again τὸ ἡθικόν is difficult. Longinus seems to have in mind the self-presentation of the speaker as a good person, charming, amusing, etc., rather than the impersonation of different types of speaker.

⁷¹ 34. 3. For ἀνηθοποίητος, Russell suggests 'without sense of character', but the sense 'unattractive', which he also notes, seems the more relevant; cf. Zucker, *op. cit. passim*, esp. pp. 37–8. Demosthenes' style lacks Hypereides' 'charm' but instead it has intense emotional power.

⁷² 34. 4. The emotion in Demosthenes gives power to the emotional effects (*pathē*), constitutes an antidote to any artificiality in his expression (cf. nn. 67–8), and so takes over the minds and emotions of the audience. Cf. 12. 3–5; Demosthenes, compared to Cicero, has more passion in him and so is more emotionally effective (ἅτε παθητικώτερος κ.τ.λ.).

⁷³ 9. 10. One might have expected Longinus to say the lines convey Ajax's *ēthos* (cf. the scholiast cited by Russell, *ad loc.*, θαυμαστὸν τὸ ἦθος). But it is the heroic *pathos* Longinus is interested in, the courageous impulse that demotes death below an honourable fight and puts Zeus in his place. Cf. the famous comment in 9. 7, "Ὀμηρος γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ... ἀνθρώπους ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ δυνάμει θεοὺς πεποιηκέναι, τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους.

⁷⁴ 9. 11, "Ὀμηρος... οὐριος συνεμπνεῖ τοῖς ἀγῶσι κ.τ.λ.; cf. LSJ, οὐριος III, and Demosthenes' θεόπεμπτα δωρήματα (34. 4). The idea that Homer is *θεῖος* is, of course, traditional; see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 2. 484–92, Ar. *Ran.* 1033, Pl. *Ion* 536a ff. For the idea that authors, including Homer,

inspiration (πνεῦμα) was at its height.⁷⁵ Correspondingly, he ascribes to it the qualities he values most in great writing: emotional intensity (σφοδρότητος), tension (τόνον), sustained 'height' (τὰ ὕψη καὶ ἱζήματα μηδαμοῦ λαμβάνοντα), a kind of overcrowded, urgent mobility of emotion (τὴν πρόχυσιν . . . τῶν ἐπαλλήλων παθῶν . . . ἀγχίστροφον . . . καταπεπυκνωμένον).⁷⁶ The *Iliad* catches hold of its audience, and involves them in the harsh realities of human conflict and confrontation (δραματικὸν . . . καὶ ἐναγώνιον . . . καὶ πολιτικὸν); even its similes convey a world that seems intensely real (ταῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας φαντασίαις).⁷⁷ The *Odyssey*, in contrast, is a later work, an 'epilogue' to the *Iliad*, more narrative and less dramatic.⁷⁸ Instead of the harsh realities of the *Iliad*, we have the fantastic and incredible adventures of Odysseus (τοῖς μυθώδεσι καὶ ἀπίστοις . . . τοῦ πρακτικοῦ κρατεῖ τὸ μυθικόν, 9. 13–14). Or, in Ithaca, we have 'realism', but of a different kind from the *Iliad*, the more comfortable domestic realism, both in situation and in personal behaviour, we associate with a Menandrian comedy of manners (τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεῶς ἡθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν οἰονεῖ κωμωδία τίς ἐστιν ἡθολογούμενη).⁷⁹ Longinus sums up: the *Odyssey* shows that the decline of *pathos* in great writers (emotional power, and the capacity to communicate this to the audience through 'emotional' situations and figures) relaxes (ἐκλύεται) into *ēthos* (the milder emotional level in the writer making a gentler type of appeal to the audience through a less intense, more 'comic', mode of portrayal).⁸⁰ Implicit here is Longinus' whole aesthetic theory, and his clear preference for a work in which the author, like a god or divine thunderbolt, takes over the audience's minds and emotions, 'astonishes', 'enslaves' them, rather than one which 'pleases', 'is charming', and 'amusing' but has no such powerful impact.⁸¹

can be θεῖοι, ἥρωες or ἰσόθεοι, cf. 4. 4, 4. 6, 35. 2, 36. 2. In the passage quoted, *Il.* 15. 605–8, the raging Hector is acting under the direct encouragement, and with the help, of Zeus, 596–614.

⁷⁵ 9. 13; the term seems to pick up the 'wind' motif in οὐριος . . . συνεμπνέει (cf. previous note), and to carry also the suggestion of divine inspiration (cf. 13. 2, many writers ἀλλοτρίῳ θεοφοροῦνται πνεύματι; 33. 5, κάκεινῃς τῆς ἐκβολῆς τοῦ δαιμονίου πνεύματος; and Russell, note on 9. 13).

⁷⁶ Similar sorts of qualities are ascribed to the 'emotional' Demosthenes' oratory; see 18. 1, ἐμπρακτότερα (cf. πρακτικοῦ, 9. 14) καὶ σοβαρώτερα συντείνει τὰ λεγόμενα . . . τὸ ἔνθον καὶ δέξυρρον κ.τ.λ.; 20. 2, τῇ ἐπαλλήλῳ . . . φορᾷ, cf. the technique ascribed to him in 22. 3–4. Cf. also at 22. 1 the natural expression of those in the grip of *pathos*: τῇδε κάκεισε ἀγχιστρόφως ἀντισπώμενοι κ.τ.λ., and Russell, *ad loc.*

⁷⁷ cf. 15. 1, Ὀγκου καὶ μεγαληγορίας καὶ ἀγώνος . . . αἱ φαντασίαι παρασκευαστικώταται; 15. 9, φαντασία . . . τοῖς λόγοις ἐναγώνια καὶ ἐμπαθῇ προσεισφέρειν . . . οὐ πείθει τὸν ἀκροατὴν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δουλοῦται. I take it Longinus has in mind the Homeric similes that are so prominent a feature of the *Iliad*; but perhaps he has in mind the various ways, in narrative and dialogue, Homer makes the action vividly real to us. Cf. the use of φαντασία in rhetoric, κάλλιστον αἰετὸν ἐμπρακτον καὶ ἐνάληθες, 15. 8.

⁷⁸ Longinus reverses Plato's preference, on ethical grounds, of narrative over dialogue (*Resp.* 396c and context). Plato, of course, distrusts the emotional involvement of the listener in expressed or represented emotions which Longinus values (*Resp.* 605c ff.).

⁷⁹ For the connection between βίος, *ēthos*, and (Menandrian) comedy, see Russell, notes on 9. 15, and nn. 55–7 above. In the later books of the *Odyssey*, in Ithaca, there is more scope for human interchange on a mundane, unimpassioned level than we find in the *Iliad*, of the kind often associated with the 'ethical style'; cf. nn. 39, 49–50, 69–71 above. For subtleties in the psychological portrayal in the *Odyssey*, esp. in connection with women, see Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, pp. 56–65. The *Odyssey* is also more 'ethical' in demarcating the good and bad *ēthos* of its figures (cf. n. 12 above), and thus shares the ethical concerns of some comedies (cf. n. 57 above); but it is not clear that Longinus has this in mind: see also discussion below.

⁸⁰ For *pathos* as a quality, or power, within the writer, cf. the images of the setting sun, and the Ocean 'withdrawing into itself' (9.13). *Ēthos* also, in 9. 15, seems partly to denote a lower emotional level in the author.

⁸¹ cf. discussion above, and refs. in nn. 65 ff.

Longinus' comment on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has a superficial similarity to Aristotle's.⁸² But the two writers are clearly using *ēthos* and *pathos* to mean rather different things, and they make their comment from a different general viewpoint. For both of them, perhaps, *pathos* has connotations of violence;⁸³ but that of emotion is a much stronger connotation in Longinus, and one that is much more resonant and suggestive in *On the Sublime* than it is in the *Poetics*. *Ēthos* in Longinus' comment may have some connotations of 'character' and 'characterization', as being an element in Menandrian 'ethical realism' (ἠθικῶς . . . βιολογούμενα) or 'comedy of manners' (κωμωδία . . . ἠθολογουμένη). But *ēthos* in Longinus is primarily a stylistic term, associated with 'sweetness', 'irony', 'urbanity', 'charm', and that seems to be an important association here.⁸⁴ The more moral connotations of *ēthos* in Aristotle, the association with 'good' character, and the idea that, in the *Odyssey*, good characters (and bad) end up with what they deserve – this is an element that is either completely absent, or at most implicit, in Longinus' comment.⁸⁵

Underlying these points of contact and divergence are certain profound similarities and differences in their overall viewpoints, which come out in their appraisals of Homer's epics. Implicit in Aristotle's comments on the *Odyssey*, as well as Longinus', is the view that this epic is in some ways 'second-best', and that it accommodates itself too easily to the audience's desires and expectations. Aristotle, as well as Longinus, suggests the *Odyssey* resembles comedy in this respect.⁸⁶ And this, in turn, implies that the *Iliad* is more tragic as well as *pathētikōn*; and perhaps too that its portrayal of violence, emotional as well as physical, and of undeserved suffering, makes the same kind of complex demands on our responses as tragedy does.⁸⁷ Yet if they share this view of the two epics, they reach it from a different understanding of *ēthos*, and of its place in aesthetic response. Aristotle's account of *ēthos* in his *Poetics*, as well as in his *Rhetoric*, presupposes a kind of ethical consensus in his audience as a precondition of the proper response to tragedy and epic as well as oratory.⁸⁸ Longinus, as the conclusion to his work shows, regards himself as living in a morally corrupt age. Indeed, part of the impetus for his work seems to be a desire to recover what is 'sublime' and inspiring in past writings.⁸⁹ Yet the 'sublime' is not wholly an ethical quality, nor is it easily assimilated into a social framework of values. It is a quality present in nature, in great ideas, in raw, intense emotion, at least if the power of these things can be embodied in a powerful verbal form.⁹⁰ It is a quality that verges on the numinous or mystical, without ceasing to be aesthetic as well, rather than an ethical one, in the ordinary sense.⁹¹ Longinus finds it in the *Iliad*, with its death-defying heroes, who stand equal to – or higher than – the gods, in its intensity of violence and passion, in the confrontation it invites with the brutal realities of human life.⁹² But he shows

⁸² *Poet.* 24, 1459b13–16; cf. discussion above.

⁸³ *Poet.* 12, 1452b11–13, cf. n. 8 above; *De Sublim.* 9. 13, cf. the heroic violence of the *pathētikōn Iliad*, 9. 10–12.

⁸⁴ cf. refs. in nn. 69–71 above. The 'charm' comes perhaps from the fabulous and incredible (9. 13–14), as well as the domestic and 'comic' (9. 15), neither of which makes intense, passionate demands on the listener.

⁸⁵ cf. n. 79 above, and contrast Aristotle's view, discussed above.

⁸⁶ *Poet.* 13, 1453a30–39, *De Sublim.* 9. 15.

⁸⁷ cf. discussion and nn. 14–16 above.

⁸⁸ cf. refs. in nn. 6, 12, 23 above.

⁸⁹ 44. 6–12; cf. 6–7, and Russell, pp. 185–6, xxii, xlii. See further Charles P. Segal, 'ΥΨΟΣ and the problem of cultural decline in the *De Sublimitate*', *HSCP* 64 (1959), 121–46.

⁹⁰ 8, 9, 10, 15, 35; hence, in part, Longinus' appeal in pre-Romantic modern Europe, cf. Russell, pp. xlv–xlvii.

⁹¹ cf. Segal, op. cit., esp. pp. 131 ff.

⁹² 9. 7, 10, 11, 13.

little of Aristotle's consciousness that such a work, precisely because of its 'tragic' intensity, may come into partial conflict with our framework of ethical values in a way that the *Odyssey* does not; or if he is conscious of this point, it does not interest him.⁹³ Thus his appraisal of the Homeric epics, while responding to some of the same qualities in each poem as Aristotle does, derives from a different theoretical position, and one that gives *ēthos* a rather different sense and evaluation.

One could pursue the *ēthos/pathos* distinction further, both in the later rhetorical and scholiastic tradition,⁹⁴ and in the writers we have already surveyed. But we have seen enough perhaps to have some sense of the main lines of the distinction and of its development in the period we have studied. Clearly there are some changes in the meaning and associations of the two terms. In Aristotle *ēthos* has primarily an ethical or moral sense, and is associated with the self-presentation of the speaker; there is a clear distinction between *ēthos* and the 'ethical' style, though he has rather little to say about the latter.⁹⁵ In later critics, *ēthos* comes virtually to mean 'the ethical style'; it becomes associated with a certain kind of emotional tenor and a range of stylistic qualities.⁹⁶ In Aristotle, *pathos* is associated primarily with the effect to be produced on the audience; he also recognizes an 'emotional' style, though he has not much to say about it.⁹⁷ In later critics, the term *pathos* can suggest the emotional style, its desired effect, or the power in the speaker or author that gives this style its power. In Longinus, especially, the latter sense is very pronounced and important, though there is some preparation for this in the earlier tradition.⁹⁸ As with *ēthos*, *pathos* acquires a range of specific stylistic associations. These changes enlarge and adapt the meaning of the distinction, but they are changes which comprehensibly reflect the differing preoccupations of the various rhetoricians, and do not reduce the distinction to meaningless confusion.

I suggested that an understanding of this distinction might give us some insight into ancient critical categories and indeed ancient literature itself. I hope that my discussion has clarified Aristotle's and Longinus' view of the two Homeric epics, at least as far as their use of this distinction is concerned. To say how far their views highlight significant features of the poems themselves would require a much fuller study; though I have indicated in footnotes and asides that I think their comments are genuinely suggestive. One of the most interesting points to emerge from the whole discussion is the idea that a mimetic poet, as well as a prose orator, has a choice of two, contrasted, modes of presentation. Either he can appeal to his audience to view his figures in an 'ethical' way, as characterized agents, whose moral or personal qualities are presented for calm and rational assessment. Or he can aim at a more intuitive

⁹³ Late nineteenth-century and Edwardian critics seem inclined to interpret questions of moral ambiguity in great art in Longinian terms, at least as far as tragedy goes. 'We could wish that Aristotle had gone farther and said explicitly that in power, even more than in virtue, the tragic hero must be raised above the common level; that he must possess a deeper vein of feeling or heightened powers of intellect or will; that the morally trivial, rather than the morally bad, is fatal to tragic effect', S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*⁴ (London, 1904, repr. New York, 1951), p. 317; cf. A. C. Bradley, *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (Oxford, 1909, repr. 1965), pp. 87–8.

⁹⁴ Rutherford, op. cit. 138–46; Lockwood, op. cit.; Zucker, op. cit.; Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity*, pp. 154, 201.

⁹⁵ cf. nn. 33–4 above.

⁹⁶ In Dionysius of Halicarnassus, there is a further development: *ēthos* signifies the state of mind of the person responding to the ethical style; cf. n. 46 above.

⁹⁷ cf. nn. 32–3 above.

⁹⁸ The idea that the author will move the audience if he is emotionally moved himself goes back a long way; cf. nn. 21, 41, 49, 80 above.

response, inducing his audience to share his figures' emotions, or to respond to the pathos of their situation, with very limited critical or ethical detachment.⁹⁹ To explore the implications of this distinction fully would require full-scale discussion. All I can do here is to record my opinion that such an exploration could reveal a good deal about ancient literary presuppositions, particularly in Latin literature, and might clarify a number of problems in literary characterization.

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⁹⁹ In rhetorical theory, the production of *pathos* is sometimes thought to depend on the speaker's successful presentation of his *ēthos*; cf. nn. 26, 41 above. Yet orators also admit, with a greater or lesser degree of frankness, that the emotional style can effectively transform an audience's view of the *ēthos* of the person and the rights and wrongs of the situation (see Arist. *Rh.* 3. 7. 4, Cic. *De Or.* 2. 194 ff., esp. 200–1, *magis affectis animis iudicum quam doctis*, Quint. 6. 2. 4–7, 23–4, *De Sublim.* 18. 2, cf. 22. 4).